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1. WHAT IS BREXIT? 
On 29 March 2017, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) 
announced its intention to leave the EU and all its 
institutions, including the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), European Civil Aviation Area 
(ECAA), European Agency for Railways (ERA), 
the European Aviation Safety Area (EASA), etc. – 
also the European Atomic Energy Community. 
Under Article 50 of the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, 
there is a two-year time period allowed to make            
a withdrawal agreement. Thus on 30 March 2019, 
the UK will no longer be an EU member, unless 
the European Council unanimously votes to extend 
this period. 
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By referendum on 23 June 2016, voters in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland voted narrowly 
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The Withdrawal Agreement is then subject to 
ratification by the European Parliament and also 
(by qualified majority vote) the European Council1 
(i.e. 16 countries representing more than 65% of 
the EU population). 
 
2. WHEN IS BREXIT? 
The UK Prime Minister has stated the intention 
to ask for an implementation period of around two 
years after withdrawal. There are suggestions that 
the Government would like this period to last until 
the end of 2021. The EU is believed to prefer 2020. 
Article 50 does not seem to allow for an 
implementation period. But the time allowed to 
make a withdrawal agreement can be extended if 
all 28 EU member states agree.  
With no such agreement, the UK leaves at 
23:00 UK time on 29 March 2019. The 
Government proposes to enshrine this in UK law.  
But if all agree, it could be 1 January 2021, 2022, 
or some other date. 
 
3. WHY IS BREXIT?? 
The UK government decided to ask UK 
residents, in a referendum, whether they thought 
that Britain should remain in, or leave, the 
European Union. The referendum was held on 23 
June 2016. England and Wales voted to leave, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland to remain. Overall 
51.9% said the UK should leave the EU, and 
48.2% said it should remain a member. Turnout 
was 72.2%, so 37.5% of the electorate voted to 
leave. Cities with a clear majority of ‘Remainers’ 
included Manchester, London and Brighton. 
The referendum was advisory and does not bind 
Parliament. But the Conservative government 
declared that it would respect the result, as did the 
Labour opposition. Only the minority Liberal 
Democrat and Green parties do not agree with this 
decision made by the main parties.  The decision to 
leave is now in parliamentary process. 
 
4. REASONS FOR THE VOTE? 
The theme of the ‘Leave’ campaign was to 
‘take back control’, but the motives of those who 
voted leave seem to be a mix of nationalism and 
feeling ‘left behind’ by economic policy. There has 
                                                 
1A qualified majority vote of the European Council is 
one that has the support of at least 16 countries, 
representing more than 65% of the EU population. 
never been an official investigation, but reasons for 
voting to leave may include: 
• Half-hearted UK government support for the 
EU over many years 
• Government austerity programme and 
spending cuts since 2010 
• Immigration increased the population, but 
public services did not keep up. Between 2010 
and 2016, the population grew at 1.5% a year, 
but spending on the health service grew by 
only half as much and the service came under 
increasing pressure 
• Many people saw immigration as the problem, 
not part of the solution, despite the fact that 
12% of the UK health workers in 2016 were 
immigrants (5% being from the EU). 
 
So there was a desire for a change in direction, 
as incomes and services were being squeezed.  
There was generally a poor understanding of the 
EU and a dismal referendum campaign in which 
the ‘Leave’ campaign emphasized how much the 
UK pays to Brussels (neglecting to mention the 
flow in the reverse direction, or the disadvantages 
of leaving).  The ‘Remain’ campaign was on the 
defensive, and when economists spoke of the costs 
of leaving and the advantages of remaining, they 
were rubbished as ‘experts’ who should not be 
trusted.2 
 
5. WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE UK? 
As one example, the European Economic Area 
(EEA) countries – Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein – pay to be in the customs union and 
single market, but have no say in the rules. There 
seems no advantage to UK in leaving membership 
to accept this less influential status. 
The European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 
comprises the EEA countries plus Switzerland.  
Switzerland has 120 different agreements with the 
EU, but does not have full access to provide 
services in EU. Again, such status would less 
                                                 
2 The printed media took sides, while the BBC, which is 
supposed to be impartial, was criticized and even taken 
to court by the Royal Economic Society (of which I am 
a member), who were outraged that despite a clear 
overwhelming majority of economists saying we should 
remain, the BBC insisted that always one economist on 
each side should be interviewed, thus giving a false 
impression that economists were divided. There was                  
a very low standard of debate on the BBC as a result of 
this policy in almost all their programming, 
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advantageous for the UK than membership, while 
such agreements would take years to conclude. 
Another free trade area, the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), exists 
between Canada and the EU. Under this, most 
tariffs are abolished, but, as Canada is not in the 
single market, customs checks are still needed to 
apply rules of origin, while the free trade in 
services is again limited. CETA took eight years to 
complete. 
Some countries – like Turkey, Andorra and San 
Marino – are in the EU customs union. They apply 
EU tariffs to their imports, but have no say in 
setting them. Again they are not in the single 
market, so non-tariff barriers apply. 
Without any specific agreements, World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules would apply. The EU 
would apply tariffs for imports from the UK, and 
vice versa.  The tariffs would have to be the same 
as those applying to the rest of the world.   
So if UK did not want to apply tariffs to 
imports from the EU, it could not apply them to 
anybody. Hong Kong and Singapore operate in this 
way, with no import duties, although there are 
some exceptions and non-tariff barriers. 
 
6. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT? 
Negotiations are continuing. But the UK 
government still shows no clear sign of knowing 
why we are leaving, what we can gain, or what we 
want, other than the ‘most frictionless trade 
possible’ between UK and EU (i.e. ‘soft’ Brexit) 
and greater control of immigration. 
The EU view is that Britain cannot be outside 
yet keep all the benefits of membership. A CETA 
agreement is regarded as most likely. The UK has 
discussed the idea of a ‘CETA Plus’ to include 
services. 
The UK government is weak, with a very small 
minority, and depends on support from the 
unionists of Northern Ireland. It remains possible 
that the government may collapse, or negotiations 
may fail. Or they may not. Nobody knows. 
In October, the Federation of German Industries 
advised its members, as a precaution, to be 
prepared for a ‘very hard Brexit’, and others have 
been saying the same thing. 
 
7. THE UK’S 12 PRINCIPLES 
A The UK set out these 12 principles in 
February 2017, before the start of negotiations: 
• The need for certainty and clarity 
• Taking control of our own laws 
• Strengthening the Union (that is the union of 
four countries that makes up the UK) 
• Protecting our strong historic ties with Ireland 
and maintaining the Common Travel Area 
(between the UK and Ireland) 
• Controlling immigration 
• Securing rights for EU nationals in the UK 
and UK nationals in the EU 
• Protecting workers’ rights 
• Ensuring free trade with European markets 
• Securing new trade agreements with other 
countries 
• Ensuring the United Kingdom remains the 
best place for science and innovation 
• Cooperating in the fight against crime and 
terrorism 
• Delivering a smooth, orderly exit from the 
EU. 
 
8. THE EFFECT OF NO AGREEMENT 
Nobody yet knows what effect any agreement 
might have.   
Highlighted EU concerns have related to the 
EU budget and the rights of EU citizens in UK.  
These are now settled in principle. The Irish 
question is still open however. A new land border 
replacing the free movement now allowed across 
over 200 roads between the two parts of Ireland 
needs to be avoided. There are 142 identified 
activities that benefit from cross-border travel, 
with shared health, ambulance service and other 
agreements. 
The UK has now promised no hard borders in 
Ireland or between Northern Ireland and the rest of 
the UK. It is not clear how this will work. These 
and many other issues need to be resolved by 
October 2018, so that the EU-27 can each have 
time to ratify the agreement by March 2019.  
Perhaps implementation can be completed by 
2022. Britain must have an election by June that 
year. 
Besides Ireland, other tricky issues remain – 
e.g. UK and EU are reported to have agreed to 
share the existing EU food trade quotas that exist 
with third countries. But the USA, Brazil, 
Argentina, Canada, New Zealand, Uruguay and 
Thailand are objecting at the WTO.  Dividing what 
is now a single quota may mean that they can 
export less to their favoured EU markets.  
Also the EEA countries (Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein) are not party to EU-UK discussions 
and need to be included in any agreement or have  
a separate agreement. 
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Whether there is agreement or not, transport 
supply and demand is likely to be affected. 
 
9. ROAD TRANSPORT 
The likely effects of Brexit on road transport 
include the following: 
• There can be no more EU cabotage in UK, or 
vice versa 
• If there are no reciprocal arrangements, EU-
UK road transport could be at threat.  There is 
a need for mutually agreed acceptance of 
documents, driving licences, etc. 
• There will be new border controls at Channel 
ports, west coast ports (e.g. Liverpool) and 
between the UK and Ireland, as well as at the 
EU ports 
• There will be a need for EU-Irish transport to 
transit UK 
• Trucks crossing the internal EU borders now 
use a Community licence, but with Brexit 
trucks may need bilateral or ECMT permits to 
cross the UK border, and these are subject to 
quota 
• TIR carnets for customs passage, normally 
restricted in number, may be needed 
• Dover now handles 8,500 trucks/day, 8,000 of 
them to or from the EU. Many are fresh food.  
It takes 20 minutes to clear the non-EU trucks, 
so this would apply to 8,000 more trucks. Yet 
there is no space for more queuing. Some 
temporary parking areas are being developed. 
 
Trucks entering the EU from Turkey queue for 
between 4 and 17 km to enter Bulgaria, and this 
takes up to 30 hours. Each driver requires an 
export declaration, invoices for the products they 
are carrying, insurance certificates and a transport 
permit for each EU nation they will drive through.  
UK could face a similar challenge for its exports to 
the EU. 
There could also be staff or vehicle shortages.  
85% of cross-Channel trucks have EU-27 
ownership, while 10% of UK truck drivers and 
23% of UK warehouse staff are from the EU-27.  
 
10. AIR TRANSPORT 
The EU single aviation market is based on 35 
separate EU legislative acts, and the UK would 
have to replace this legislation. Also, about 60% of 
UK air passengers land in the EU, but if there is no 
agreement, no UK airlines will be able to land in 
the EU. The UK will seek agreements, but 
Lufthansa, Air-France-KLM and others are 
reported to oppose concessions to the UK. If the 
UK leaves EASA, it will have to create and staff          
a new safety regulator. 
It is of course likely that agreements will be 
reached, but maybe not on Day 1. 
There are likely to be fewer flights and reduced 
activity by low cost airlines. Some observers 
suggest that fares could rise 15–30%. Lesser 
routes, such as Katowice-Doncaster, could be left 
unserved.  
EasyJet plans to become EU-based, while 
RyanAir will become British-based, not EU, unless 
it restructures also. It is registered in Ireland, but 
most of its shareholders are British. To have EU 
rights, airlines need to be controlled, as well as 
based, in the EU. Air France says it will object to 
any relaxation of this rule. 
The EU-US Open Skies agreement will cease to 
apply to the UK – as will agreements with 16 other 
non-EU countries. 85% of UK international air 
traffic is governed by EU-wide agreements which 
will need replacement. 
Eurocontrol membership is not affected. It is             
a separate body from the EU. 
 
11. POSSIBLE MITIGATION 
Of course the adverse effects can be mitigated, 
by such things as: 
• The UK could join the ECAA and EASA.  
But it would then have to follow EU rules, 
which are enforced by the ECJ. The UK says 
it will no longer be subject to ECJ rulings 
after Brexit, so this is problematic 
• There could be new UK-EU and UK-USA 
open skies agreements 
• There could be new bilateral agreements with 
the 16 other countries that have agreements 
with the EU. 
But new agreements may take years, and fewer 
flights and higher prices for the UK may be 
inevitable. 
 
12. RAIL TRANSPORT 
The Community of European Railway and 
Infrastructure Companies (CER) says that if there 
are no arrangements for continued cooperation, 
conditions could be challenging: 
• Access is needed for British operators in the 
EU, and vice-versa 
• There needs to be continued free movement of 
people 
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• There needs to be continued harmonised 
development of the Single European Railway 
Area under the technical pillar of the Fourth 
Railway Package 
• There needs to be a common travel area and 
seamless borders for rail freight between 
Ireland and the rest of the EU 
• There is a need for UK to continue to 
contribute to EU research and innovation 
programmes 
• 20% of the UK railway workforce are citizens 
of the EU-27 – up to 40% in some parts of the 
railway industry. 
 
Eurotunnel has been hopeful that the effect will 
be neutral.  But now it is also getting worried: 
“Any kind of disruption to fluid movement [of 
goods through the tunnel] is going to cause                    
a blockage which will paralyse all of the supplier 
countries in Europe” (November 2017) 
 
13. PORTS 
4.2 million trucks/year enter UK through the 
Dover or Folkestone area, by ferry or the Channel 
Tunnel – see Figure 1. The UK has few customs 
officials at these ports, and few trained customs 
officials elsewhere. More customs officers will 
also be needed on the EU side.  It takes two years 
to train a French customs officer. 
There is no space for new traffic lanes or 
warehouses in Dover or Folkestone. As Britain has 
about 50 ports, there might be scope to disperse the 
imports and exports among these. The EU ports 
may have similar problems, although Calais is said 
to have space. 
 
14. SHIPPING 
Shipping accounts for 95% of British 
international trade. Of the UK’s lift-on, lift-off 
(LO-LO) traffic, 31% is to or from the EU, while 
for roll-on roll-off (RO-RO) traffic, the figure is 
78%. 
Shipping is governed by International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) rules, rather than EU rules, so 
it will be able to continue. But there will be an end 
to cabotage – EU-27 ships will not be able to 
operate domestically in the UK, and vice-versa.   
There may be a re-routing of some Channel 
ferries to avoid bottlenecks at Dover or Folkestone. 
Depending on the new customs regime, there may 
be a return to the days of ‘booze cruises’, to 
quench thirst and buy supplies at duty-free prices 
on the ferries. But with these arrangements the 
import quantities would be restricted as compared 
with today. 
One factor which has not yet had much 
attention is that Gibraltar bunker fuel is widely 
used, as it is tax free. But 35% of this is stored in 
Fig. 1.  
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Spain, and this link may be severed or subject to 
duty. 
If the UK leaves the single market, as expected, 
then it will be more complicated for UK to use 
Rotterdam or other EU ports for third-country 
trade. Such trade – in both directions – is 
commonplace now.   
The UK shipping industry, like the railway 
industry, fears a loss of skilled EU workers, and 
the extra costs that may result. 
 
15. THE DEMAND SIDE 
Trade 
UK exports to the EU-27 are 7.5% of UK GDP.  
EU-27 exports to the UK are 2.5% of EU-27 GDP.  
Thus in general the effect of Brexit will be greater 
on the UK side. The UK imports 7% of its fuel 
from the EU but over 75% of its food.   
After the referendum the pound fell by 13% 
against the euro, and 20% against the US dollar.  
This is likely to lead to fewer UK imports in future 
as domestic production (and possibly exports) will 
become more competitive due to this exchange rate 
shift. 
But the introduction of tariffs and borders is 
likely to outweigh this effect. These factors will 
cause UK exports to fall. The EU tariffs average 
10.9% for agriculture, 10% for cars, and 3.9% for 
other goods. The UK’s four main exports to the EU 
are cars and car parts, consumer goods, health care 
products and technology. Adding the costs of non-
tariff barriers, the average price of these main 
exports to EU customers will rise by 10.4%.  
Calculations for Germany suggest that their 
exports to the UK will fall by 33% (with a hard 
Brexit) or by 9% (with a soft Brexit). But the effect 
is worse for the UK. Their exports to Germany 
would fall by 50% (hard Brexit) or 24% (soft). 
Under the WTO rules, which would apply in 
the absence of a trade agreement, the UK would 
also have to apply duties on imports from the EU-
27 (unless it abolished import duties for all third 
countries). And with its loss of EU-wide trade 
agreements, the UK may face higher tariffs 
elsewhere. 65 international trade deals could lapse. 
Cross-border ‘just-in-time’ trade will also be in 
jeopardy, because of tariffs and/or border delays. 
This affects both parties. For example Zeebrugge 
reports that 45% of its traffic is to or from the UK.  
Much of this traffic may be at risk. 
 
 
 
16. INCOME AND GROWTH 
UK living standards are falling, and GDP 
growth is becoming Europe’s slowest. The official 
forecasts of UK GDP in 2030 are lower by 5%-6% 
because of Brexit. There will be an effect on EU-
27 also. An overall GDP reduction of 1.5% in the 
EU-27 is forecast for a hard Brexit – in Belgium 
2.35%.  Ireland will be the worst hit, the forecast 
range of 3.4% to 9.4% reduction in Irish GDP 
being worse than that for the UK. 
There will be fewer personal movements even 
if a visa-free regime is retained. This is already 
happening. Two-thirds of UK-EU air traffic is 
made up of UK-based passengers, and as incomes 
are squeezed, demand is softening. 
There is also lower UK investment due to the 
uncertainty and depressed demand. Low 
investment means low take-up of new or changed 
opportunities. 40% of British businesses have 
reported that they are investing less because of 
Brexit fears.  
 
17. BREXIT’S LONG-TERM IMPACT 
Deutsche Bank has said it fears a hard Brexit 
could cause a world financial crisis.  It says Brexit 
has ‘introduced a major risk to economic activity, 
the ﬁnancial architecture of Europe and perhaps 
more concerning, the geo-politics and security of 
the region’. 
It seems likely that there will be an increase in 
UK protectionism, and lower trade with the EU.  
One recent estimate by the UK’s National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research foresees a drop 
of 59% in UK exports to the EU-27. 
For the UK, the overall effect is likely to lead to 
a diminishing importance of the UK economy and 
its place in the world. 
The EU will also change – Britain has been a 
leader in developing the EU policies of openness, 
competition, and the single market. 
The UK could try to compete with the EU 
through becoming a low wage, low tax economy 
with light regulation.   
Many British citizens are applying for EU 
citizenship where they can. There are likely to be 
more UK applicants for Polish citizenship (I will 
be one, if Polish law allows). 
But this is largely supposition. Nobody can yet 
be sure, as the final agreement – if any – has not 
been reached. 
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18. THE EFFECT OF BREXIT ON 
TRANSPORT 
Brexit seems now likely, but nobody yet knows 
if it will be hard or soft – or chaotic. But after the 
initial shock, it is likely that there will be a gradual 
improvement in travel and transport conditions. 
Both demand and supply will be lower under 
most assumptions. The EU and its eastern and 
southern neighbour countries may increase supply 
within the EU-27 to compensate for the lower 
British contribution. 
Transport vehicles (including ships and aircraft) 
can be moved elsewhere, and relocated in the UK 
or the EU-27 as appropriate. But with lower 
demand, this might slow down new purchases and 
thus reduce the rate of modernisation.   
Infrastructure investments are more at risk – 
e.g. the proposed third runway for Heathrow, or 
investments in some smaller airports – due to the 
lower demand. But there may be a new need to 
invest in border controls and perhaps the smaller 
Channel ports. There is likely to be a growth in the 
number and size of inland ports, customs 
arrangements permitting. 
There will be a return of customs brokers, and 
higher transport costs because of the slower cross-
border journeys and lower investment. But intra-
EU-26 journeys will not be affected by the border 
issues. In the short term, there may be more road 
and air competition in the smaller EU, due to 
surplus vehicles, vessels and aircraft. 
 
19. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
(NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 2017) 
The Dutch Parliament is now telling us “What 
was long considered impossible is suddenly 
thinkable: a chaos scenario in which the UK 
abruptly leaves the EU on 29 March 2019 without 
an exit agreement, a transition period or                       
a framework for future relations. The Netherlands 
must be ready for this. Government services such 
as customs and inspection agencies must be 
prepared. Roadmaps must be ready for several 
economic sectors, notably transport, agriculture 
and fisheries.” 
So now we have the third option: not hard, not 
soft: the EU should prepare for a ‘chaotic and 
disorderly’ Brexit. 
The idea that part of the UK (Northern Ireland) 
could mirror the single market has been put 
forward in the Joint EU-UK Report to the 
December EU Summit. This is to avoid the border 
splitting Ireland. But there was also a last-minute 
promise not to split Northern Ireland from the rest 
of the UK. This would move the effective UK-EU 
border somewhere else, probably the Irish Sea. But 
that would not be acceptable to Northern Ireland, 
which is in the UK but would be cut off from the 
rest of the country by such a border. The solution 
was not made clear in the report, and it might mean 
that there would be no border between Ireland and 
the UK at all. 
That might imply a soft Brexit. But the report 
repeated that UK will leave the single market and 
the customs union. The discussions will be 
ongoing on 2018.   
 
20. CLOSING THOUGHT 
“If misinformation drove support for Brexit, 
then leaving the EU will do nothing to mitigate 
voters’ discontent.” 
 
(UK in a Changing Europe) 
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